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Abstract. 
It has been alleged that Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. More 
specifically, it is argued that this follows from the fact that Presentism and The Special 
Theory of Relativity are incompatible. The aim of this thesis is to assess whether the 
Presentist can refute this argument. I shall argue that whilst it is problematic for the Presentist 
to dispute the claim that their theory is incompatible with The Special Theory of Relativity, 
they can successfully refute the argument that their theory is therefore incompatible with our 
most fundamental theories of physics. My conclusion will be that, as it stands, there is no 
sound argument to suggest Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. 
This thesis provides a case study of the interplay between metaphysical and physical theories. 
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Section 1: Introduction. 
 
1.1 Setting the scene. 
One answer to the question of what exists is that just the present events and things exist. This 
is a view know as Presentism. It has been strongly suggested that: 
 
(1) Presentism is incompatible with the results of our most fundamental physics.  
 
The most prominent argument in favour of (1) is via consideration of the Special Theory of 
Relativity (from here on ‘STR’).1,2 That is, it has been argued that (1) is true due to (2): 
 
(2) Presentism is incompatible with STR.  
 
The inference from (2) to the suggestion that 1 is true implies either that STR is part 
of our most fundamental theory of physics or for some other reason that (3) is true:  
 
(3) If 2 then 1.  
 
This is simply to say that due to the alleged incompatibility of Presentism with STR, 
it is often suggested that Presentism is therefore incompatible with our most fundamental 
physics. The principle aim of this thesis is to ascertain whether Presentists can defend 
themselves from this argument. To sketch this argument we can display it as such:   
 
                                                        
1
 Bradley Monton, ‘Presentism and Quantum Gravity’ Ch. 14 in Dennis Dieks (ed.) The Ontology of 
Spacetime, pp. 263-280. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., 2006. pp. 264-5.  
2
 Notable examples of this argument exist in Hilary Putnam, ‘Time and Physical Geometry’, The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 240-247. New York: The Journal of Philsophy,1967.  
And in C. W. Rietdijk, ‘A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of 
Relativity’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 341-344. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1966. 
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THE ARGUMENT:   
Premise 1: Presentism is incompatible with STR.     (2) 
Premise 2: If 2 then 1.         (3) 
Conclusion: Presentism is incompatible with the results of our most  
fundamental Physics.         (1)  
 
This is clearly a valid argument. My aim in what follows will be to show that it is in 
fact unsound. I shall be taking for granted that the Presentist wishes to show that this, the best 
argument in favor of (1), can be properly refuted. Or, to put this another way, I shall assume 
that the viability of Presentism is greatly threatened if (1) is true as I believe it is. As such, I 
shall be assuming that it is in the Presentists’ best interest to provide a good refutation of THE 
ARGUMENT.  
As to why it is important for the Presentist to refute (1), I take it for granted that the 
Presentist is interested in the compatibility of their theory with the findings of our best 
physics. I shall not be giving extensive arguments in favor of this claim. That is, I do not 
expect Presentists who are not interested in upholding a commitment to scientific realism or 
who, for other reasons, discount the threat of (1) (should it be true), to be moved to find (1) 
threatening by the end of this thesis. I shall simply assume that they ought to find (1) 
threatening and shall aim in what follows to show that THE ARGUMENT can be refuted by 
the Presentist who does find (1) threatening. 
For clarity later on, it helps to establish what it would take for (1) to be true. For (1) 
to be true it requires that our most fundamental physical theory has proven or entails the 
existence of non-present events. To put this another way, the following must hold if (1) is 
true: 
 
(4) For some physical theory, T, that proves (1), (1) is true if and only if there is no 
more fundamental theory, T*, that is compatible with Presentism.  
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Further, I contend that the truth of (1) ought to depend on the empirical consequences 
of physical theories and not on any metaphysical assumptions that exist as a part of a 
formulation or interpretation of those theories. That is, if it is argued that the results of some 
theory, T, in physics proves (1), it should be the case that all empirically equivalent theories 
to T should also be incompatible with Presentism. To put this another way, I shall assume (5): 
 
(5) For some physical theory, T, that proves (1); (1) is true if and only if all 
empirically equivalent physical theories to T also entail the incompatibility of 
Presentism.  
 
In assuming (5), I am hoping to guard against the possibility that some physical 
theory proves (1) simply in virtue of assumptions built into that theory. The importance of (5) 
will become clearer later on. I find it to be a rather uncontroversial claim but acknowledge 
that some may disagree with it. 
Assuming (4) and (5) are required for proving (1), the inference from (2) to (1) (or 
the conditional claim in (3)) is only acceptable if there is no theory of physics more 
fundamental than STR that is compatible with Presentism and there is no empirically 
equivalent theory to STR that is compatible with Presentism. Taking this on board we can 
flesh THE ARGUMENT out a bit more providing some sub-premises for the second premise 
to capture this requirement.  
 
THE ARGUMENT:   
Premise 1: Presentism is incompatible with STR.    (2)  
Premise 2: Given: (i): There is no empirically equivalent theory to 
STR compatible with Presentism.   
        And: (ii): There is no theory more fundamental than 
STR compatible with Presentism. 
        Then: If (2) then (1).     (3)  
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Conclusion: Presentism is incompatible with the results of our most        
                    fundamental Physics.                   (1) 
  
As mentioned, I feel the Presentist should and can respond to THE ARGUMENT. 
Before detailing the available responses to THE ARGUMENT I shall provide some relevant 
background information about Presentism to better articulate the commitments of the view 
and my motivations for defending it from THE ARGUMENT. Section 2 will be concerned 
with detailing STR and the argument in favour of (2). In Section 3 I shall evaluate responses 
to THE ARGUMENT starting with the rejection of (2) that I shall argue is problematic for the 
Presentist. Following that I shall turn to the rejection of sub-premise (i) and finally the 
rejection of sub-premise (ii). I shall contend that the latter two approaches are viable routes in 
response for the Presentist and as such conclude that THE ARGUMENT is not sound and that 
there exists no compelling argument in favour of (1).      
 
1.2 The Motivations behind Presentism. 
Presentism is a theory of temporal ontology. It is the view that only the present events and 
things exist. Furthermore, Presentism is an A-theoretic view of time. A-theoretic views hold 
that events in time possess properties of past-ness, futurity or present-ness.
3
 The view is that 
events change with respect to which of these properties they hold as time passes. That is, 
future events become present and then past as time passes. These are also known as tensed 
theories of time. A-theoretic views are committed to the view that temporal passage is an 
objective feature of the world.
4
 
In contrast to the A- theory is the B-theory. According to the B-theory events simply 
bear unchanging relations of being before or after with respect to other events.
5
 These are also 
                                                        
3
 Robin Le Poidevin, ‘The Experience and Perception of Time’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2011 Edition. First published Aug, 2000; Substantive revision Nov, 
2009. Viewed October 3, 2013, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/time-experience/>. 
4
 ibid. 
5
 ibid. 
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known as tenseless theories of time. The B-theory denies the reality of tensed properties such 
as past-ness, present-ness and futurity.
6
 The present is thus not a defined moment according to 
the B-theory, it is at most an indexical notion on this view. The most prominent B-theoretic 
view of temporal ontology is Eternalism – the view that all times exist equally. On this view, 
we can conceive of time as analogous to space. All times exist just as all places exist. We do 
not consider here as being ontologically privileged or more real than over there and nor do 
we, on this view, conceive of now as being ontologically privileged in comparison to other 
times.
7
 
Eternalists (and B-theorists at large) do not deny that we have an experience of 
temporal passage but they do deny that temporal passage is an objective feature of the world 
in the way that it is for A-theoretic views like Presentism.
8
 According to B-theoretic views 
like Eternalism, the passage of time is not an objective feature of the world but simply arises 
as a result of the B-theoretic properties of events and due to the way we experience the 
world.
9,10
 
The reason I wish to defend Presentism from THE ARGUMENT is twofold. Firstly, 
because I sympathize with the A-theoretic intuition that the passage of time is more 
substantial than as it is construed as according to the B-theory or Eternalism. That is, I feel 
the A-theoretic view that temporal passage is an objective feature of the world better captures 
the experience of passage than any B-theoretic view does or could in asserting that it is not an 
objective feature of the world. Secondly, I consider Presentism to be the only tenable A-
theoretic view of temporal ontology because non-Presentist A-theories face, what I feel is a 
serious epistemic problem I shall refer to as The Present Problem.  
                                                        
6
 ibid. 
7
 Mark Hinchliff, ‘The Puzzle of Change’, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 10, pp. 119-136. Malden 
(MA): Wiley-Blackwell. 1996. p. 122. 
8
 Le Poidevin, op. cit. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 It should also be noted that I am assuming that there is a substantial difference between Presentism 
and Eternalism. 
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To briefly explain The Present Problem; non-Presentist A-theoretic views distinguish 
the Present as ontologically privileged but also admit, unlike Presentism, that there are other 
times (be them past or future). The problem for these theories is that they offer no good 
reason by which we can know that we are present.
11
 This is not a problem for Presentism for 
the Presentist can respond that we must be present as only the present exists. Nor is this a 
problem for Eternalism for that theory is not committed to the A-theoretic conception of a 
privileged present moment. I shall not explore this issue deeply but wish to flag it here as a 
part of the motivation for endorsing Presentism and because The Present Problem will arise in 
later discussions. 
It should also be noted that I will not be arguing in defense of the intuition that 
temporal passage is an objective feature of the world. That is, I do not expect those who do 
not share this intuition to be moved to accept it by the end of this discussion. I shall simply be 
taking the holding of this intuition as a principle motivation for favoring Presentism over 
Eternalism. As such, I shall not be arguing in favour of the claim that Presentism is more 
explanatorily powerful than Eternalism or any other theory of temporal ontology. I simply 
wish to highlight that a key motivation for believing that Presentism is preferable theory to B-
theoretic views is due to fact that it does posit objective temporal passage as this is taken to 
better explain the undeniably phenomenal experience of temporal passage.  
I wish to flag this motivation here as later on I shall explore modified versions of 
Presentism that arguably fail to capture the objective reality of temporal passage. As I take the 
objective reality of temporal passage to be a key motivation for endorsing Presentism over 
Eternalism, I take it that this aspect of Presentism should be preserved if we are to modify 
Presentism in order to respond to THE ARGUMENT. This will be dealt with in more detail 
later on but for now it is useful to state that I am not interested in defending just any view that 
                                                        
11
 Craig Bourne, ‘When Am I?’ Ch. 5 in Craig Bourne A Future for Presentism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. Published to Oxford Scholarship Online January 2007. Downloadable pdf 
format viewed October 10, 2013. <www.oxfordscholarship.com>. pp. 1-2 (page numbers refer to 
downloadable pdf version from here on). 
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holds that the present events exist. Rather, I am only interested in defending Presentism*, the 
view that entails all the following commitments: 
 
Presentism*:  a) all and only the present events exist. 
   b) the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. 
   c) the present problem is avoided. 
 
These desiderata may appear trivial at this stage but as well see later on there do exist 
versions of Presentism (adopted in order to avoid THE ARGUMENT) that I suggest fail to 
fulfill these characteristics. It is clear that a) is rather trivial – all versions of Presentism 
should hold that only the present things exist, that just is the view. b) is an articulation of what 
could be said to be primary motivation of behind adopting an A-theory over a B-theory and c) 
expresses the primary motivation for adopting Presentism over other A-theoretic views. 
Because b) and c) respectively capture some key motivation for adopting Presentism over 
other theories of temporal ontology, I contend neither should be abandoned if we are to 
modify Presentism. The point being, I am uninterested in defending versions of Presentism 
that do not meet the above desiderata of Presentism*. That is, I am not simply interested in 
defending any view that might be called ‘Presentism’ in this thesis but rather a proper subset 
of those views, that is, versions of Presentism*. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to defend 
Presentism* from the following claim: 
 
 (1*) Presentism* is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. 
 
In light of this, it is best to reformulate THE ARGUMENT to better reflect the aim of this 
thesis – that is, to defend Presentism* from (1*). We can thus re-express THE ARGUMENT 
as:   
  Patrick Dempsey - 309257670 
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THE ARGUMENT*:
12
   
Premise 1: Presentism* is incompatible with STR.    (2*)  
Premise 2: Given: (i): There is no empirically equivalent theory to 
STR compatible with Presentism*.   
        And: (ii): There is no theory more fundamental than 
STR compatible with Presentism*. 
        Then: If (2) then (1).     (3*)  
Conclusion: Presentism* is incompatible with the results of our  
        most fundamental Physics.      (1*) 
 
In Section 3 I shall examine and assess three responses to THE ARGUMENT*. 
Before doing so, in Section 2 I shall explain STR and the argument in favour of the claim that 
it is incompatible with Presentism. That is, the argument for (2*). 
 
Section 2: The First Premise. 
This section will focus on explicating the argument in favour of the first premise in THE 
ARGUMENT*– the claim that Presentism is incompatible with STR. Before detailing this 
particular argument, I shall offer some background information about STR.  
 
2.1 The Special Theory of Relativity. 
The Special Theory of Relativity is a physical theory of the measurement of motion in inertial 
frames proposed by Albert Einstein. The theory couples the Galilean Principle of Relativity 
that the same physical laws will hold true in all inertial frameworks with the law of the 
                                                        
12
 From here on, reference to the premises or sub-premises of THE ARGUMENT will be to those in 
this argument, that is, the one concerned with Presentism* unless otherwise marked. 
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propagation of light – the law that light travels at a constant speed in straight lines in a 
vacuum in all inertial frames.
13
  
Long before STR was proposed, the Principle of Relativity was established by 
Galileo and had later been applied to Newtonian physics. That is, in Newtonian physics the 
principle of Relativity held that Newton’s laws of motion applied in all inertial frames.14 The 
Galilean transformations are used in Newtonian physics to describe how the different 
measured coordinates of an event as observed from different inertial frames relate to one 
another. It is taken as an axiom in Newtonian Physics that there is such a thing as absolute 
time and space.
15
 That is, it is assumed that there is an objective or universal time that all 
inertial frames share.  
Einstein’s STR extended the scope of the Principle of relativity to account for not 
only the laws of motion, but all laws of physics and to accommodate the invariance of the 
speed of light.
16
 The consequence of this was that many of the assumptions of Newtonian 
physics were overturned – the invariance of time and space intervals that was assumed by 
Newtonian physics was replaced with the notion of invariant space-time intervals. 
17
The 
Galilean transformations were traded in for the Lorentz transformations to determine and 
relate the disagreement of the coordinates of an event between inertial frames.  
The famously counter-intuitive consequences that result from STR and that are 
captured and expressed through the Lorentz transformations are time-dilation, length-
contraction and the relativity of simultaneity.
18
 STR predicts that observers in different 
inertial frames will observe different temporal and spatial coordinates for the same events.
19
 
This is counterintuitive but it is unsurprising that these effects had not previously been 
                                                        
13
 Craig Bourne, ‘Physics for Philosophers’ Ch. 1 in Craig Bourne A Future for Presentism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. Published to Oxford Scholarship Online January 2007. Downloadable 
pdf format viewed August 25, 2013. <www.oxfordscholarship.com>. p. 6 (page numbers refer to 
downloadable pdf version from here on). 
14
 ibid., p. 6. 
15
 ibid., p. 6. 
16
 ibid., p. 6. 
17
 ibid., p. 9. 
18
 ibid., pp. 9-10. 
19
 ibid., p. 9. 
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noticed in empirically investigations as these disagreements only become significant when 
relative motion is close to the speed of light.  
The result of STR that is of most consequence to this discussion is that observers in 
different frames of reference will disagree about what events are simultaneous with each 
other – this is the relativity of simultaneity. The events observed as simultaneous to one 
observer in one inertial frame of reference may not be observed to be simultaneous for 
another observer travelling at high speed relative to the first observer. That is, simultaneity, 
according to STR, is at best a relative notion. 
On the Newtonian physical model observers in relative motion can agree upon which 
events are simultaneous with each other. It is an objective fact as to what events occur at a 
time and thus which events are simultaneous with each other. As such, Newtonian physics 
incorporates a notion of absolute simultaneity. On this view we can refer to a set of 
objectively simultaneous events at a particular time in the pre-relativistic model of physics. 
STR rendered this impossible in demonstrating that time was not invariant. The relativity of 
simultaneity or rather, the lack of absolute simultaneity means that in STR there is no sense in 
which time can be carved up into sets of objectively simultaneous events (as in Newtonian 
physics). Another way of expressing this is that there is no fixed foliation of space-time 
according to STR. It is this shift in the conception of time where we find an argument against 
Presentism arise.  
Let us now consider an example in the same vein as the famous train examples given 
by Einstein to illustrate the relativity of simultaneity that we can refer back to ensure clarity in 
later discussion. Imagine two observers, John and Penny. Imagine that John is standing on a 
train platform and Penny is travelling vey fast in a train past John on the platform. Imagine 
that Penny is sat equidistant from each end of the carriage. There are two lights aligned with 
her in the middle of the carriage one pointing to the back and one pointing the front. Imagine 
for Penny that the two lights turn on simultaneously and the light rays they respectively emit 
reach the end of the carriage they are each pointing towards at the same time. Let us label the 
reaching of the backwards point to the back of the carriage ‘A’ and label the reaching of the  
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forwards pointing light ‘B’. Imagine also that when A and B occur (simultaneously from 
Penny’s point of view) that Penny is level with John standing on the platform.  
John also observes the lights go on but according to the results of STR he will 
disagree that the light signals of each torch reach the ends of the carriage simultaneously. 
That is, for John, A and B are not simultaneous events. John will observe A occurring before 
B. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows how the events in the train will be observed differently for 
both Penny and John. In the pictures, t=1 is the time at which the light rays are emitted and 
t=3 is the time Penny observes A and B to occur.  
 
 Figure 1: The differing perspectives of Penny and John.  
Penny’s perspective (inside the carriage): 
 
t=1  
(the light rays are emitted)  
 
 
 
t=2 
(Some time  before A and B) 
  
 t=3 
 (A and B occur)  
 
 
John’s perspective (from the platform): 
 
t=1 
(the light rays are emitted)                                                             
    
 
 
 
 t=2 
(A occurs) 
 
 
B! A! 
A! 
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 t=3 
(B is still yet to occur) 
 
 
The first three images depict what Penny observes. The last three images depict how 
those events are seen from John’s frame of reference. John sees the carriage move and so the 
point at which the light is emitted (represented by the black dotted line) is closer to the back 
of the carriage by the time t=3. As such, he observes the light reaching the back of the 
carriage (A) before he observes the light reaching the front (B). At t=3 John and Penny are 
level. For Penny A and B are simultaneous with her being level with John, whilst for John 
neither A nor B are simultaneous with being level with Penny. For John A occurs at t=2 and 
B is yet to occur at t=3.  
We can depict the differences in observations between the reference frames of John 
and Penny via a Minkowski spacetime diagram as in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
What the graph in Figure 2 depicts are the respective coordinate systems 
corresponding to Penny’s (black) and John’s (red) inertial frames of reference at the point at 
which Penny and John are level (that is, at t=3). In the black reference frame A and B are 
Figure 2: 
Penny’s 
(black) and 
John’s (red) 
respective 
reference 
frames 
depicted in 
Minkowski 
space. 
  ct 
  x 
  x’ 
  ct’ 
  B 
  A 
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simultaneous – this frame shows us how the events occur for Penny. In the Red frame we see 
how the events occur for John when level with Penny: A is already past and B still future. The 
titled axes graphically represent the different perspectives each observer will have of events A 
and B when level with each other. This helpfully illustrates the counterintuitive results of the 
relativity of simultaneity that will be crucial in explaining the argument in favour of (2*) in 
the next subsection.  
 
2.2 The incompatibility of Presentism and STR. 
As stated, the most prominent argument in favour of (1*) rests on an argument in favour of 
(2*) – the claim that Presentism is incompatible with STR. In this subsection I shall explore 
this argument.     
The broad argumentative arc of those who have claimed that STR is incompatible 
with Presentism is that given STR and other allegedly trivial assumptions we can conclude 
that non-present events must exist. The common suggestion is that STR entails the existence 
of non-present events and thus has shown Presentism to be false. I shall focus here on Hilary 
Putnam’s argument given in his paper ‘Time and Physical Geometry’.20 
Putnam delivers the argument that STR and Presentism are incompatible as a 
reductio; he assumes both Presentism and STR to be true and then shows that taking the 
assumptions of both theories leads to curious and contradictory results. His conclusion is that 
something has to give, either Presentism or STR. Since, Putnam suggests, STR is one of our 
most fundamental and successful scientific theories, we should reject Presentism.
21
  
Fleshing out Putnam’s argument , he refers to a view of time he calls ‘the man on the 
street’s view of time’.22 It is the view that what exists is what is present, past things used to 
exist and future things do not exist yet – that is, Presentism.23 He assumes this view of 
                                                        
20
 Hilary Putnam, ‘Time and Physical Geometry’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 240-
247. New York: The Journal of Philsophy,1967. 
21
 ibid., p. 240. 
22
 ibid., p. 240. 
23
 ibid., p. 240. 
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temporal ontology (Presentism) and a further three assumptions about reality that allegedly 
hang with this view. They are: A1) that I-now am real; A2) at least someone else is real and 
that this someone else could be in relative motion to me; and A3) if the things that stand in 
the relation R to me, now are real, then those things that stand in the relation to you (or 
someone else who is real) now are also real.
24
  
The first two assumptions are fairly trivial – most Presentists, or anyone for that 
matter, would not feel the need to object to the notion that they exist and that at least someone 
else (who could be in relative motion to them) also exists. 3) is essentially just the contention 
that the relation of being-real-for is transitive. That is, if X is real for Y and Y is real for Z, 
then X is real for Z. I shall call this assumption ‘the principle of ontic transitivity’.  These 
assumptions are, at least on face value, quite uncontroversial but it is important to mention 
them as some philosophers disagree that they are assumptions that hang with Presentism.   
Putnam goes on to suggest that, bearing in mind we have assumed the Present things 
are all and only the real things and have assumed 1), 2) and 3), if we further assume STR we 
encounter a contradiction.
25
 Let’s go back to the example of Penny and John from the 
previous subsection in order to explicate how Putnam arrives at this contradiction. Due to the 
relativity of simultaneity Penny and John disagree about the simultaneity of A and B – for 
Penny they are simultaneous events, for John they are not. With reference to his example, 
Putnam’s argument is as follows. Imagine at t=3 that Penny is simultaneous with and so real 
for John. What’s more, event B is simultaneous with and so real for Penny. Due to the 
principle of ontic transitivity it follows that thus B is real for John. However, B is future for 
John and so future events must exists. This directly contradicts Presentism which we already 
assumed and as such something has to give.    
The argument can be generalized as follows. For any observer, O, we can imagine 
another observer, O’, in high speed relative motion to O whom O observes is simultaneous 
with her in her inertial frame. What’s more given O and O’ and the results of STR, we can 
                                                        
24
 ibid., pp. 240-1. 
25
 ibid., pp. 242-3. 
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imagine an event, E, which is future for O but present for O’ (given their relative motion). As 
such for any two observers, O and O’, if we assume Presentism, STR and the principle of 
ontic transitivity it follows that if O’ is real for O and E is real for O’ then E is real and future 
for O. Thus future events exist. This succinctly illustrates the alleged incompatibility of STR 
and Presentism and thus the argument  in favour of (2*).  
The problem arises out of the trio of commitments – Presentism, the results of STR 
and ontic transitivity. Presentism as it is traditionally phrased in a pre-relativistic spacetime 
does come with a commitment to ontic transitivity. In a pre-relativistic spacetime there is an 
absolute space and an absolute time. As such there is a sense in which there is an objective 
matter of fact as to what events occur at a time. Thus there obviously exists a relation of 
absolute simultaneity binding the absolutely simultaneous events at an instant. Presentism is 
the view that what exists is present. Another way to articulate this in a pre-relativistic 
spacetime is that what exists is absolutely simultaneous with some present event. The relation 
of absolute simultaneity shared between the present events in a pre-relativistic spacetime 
clearly has ontic transitivity built into it. Putnam’s argument demonstrates that when we 
marry the consequences of STR with Presentism and the allegedly entailed principle of ontic 
transitivity we arrive at a contradiction.     
In the next section I shall go on to examine three responses to THE ARGUMENT* 
which attack one of its premises or sub-premises. It is important to properly present the 
argument in favour of (2) as I have done for one of the responses to THE ARGUMENT* to 
be discussed involves challenging the argument in favour of (2*).   
 
Section 3: Responding to THE ARGUMENT*. 
Having established the argument in favour of the claim that Presentism is incompatible with 
STR I shall now go on and assess responses to THE ARGUMENT* at large. To restate, here 
is THE ARGUMENT*:  
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THE ARGUMENT*:   
Premise 1: Presentism* is incompatible with STR.    (2*) 
Premise 2: Given: (i): There is no empirically equivalent theory to 
STR compatible with Presentism*.   
        And: (ii): There is no theory more fundamental than 
STR compatible with Presentism*. 
        Then: If (2) then (1).     (3*)  
Conclusion: Presentism* is incompatible with the results of our 
                    most fundamental Physics.                 (1*) 
 
I shall go on to examine and assess three different response routes for the Presentist 
that crop up in the literature. Each of these response routes is concerned with rejecting one of 
the premises (or sub-premises) of THE ARGUMENT.  
Allow me to sketch out the ensuing discussion in section 3. In sub-section 3.1 I shall 
first look at responses to THE ARGUMENT that challenge the first premise and thus the 
argument in favour of (2*). This involves responding to the kind of argument Putnam puts 
forward in favour of the claim that STR and Presentism are incompatible. The most 
prominent proponents of this response claim that Putnam’s argument does not succeed for the 
Presentist is free to reject the commitment to ontic transitivity that Putnam suggests is built 
into Presentism. The idea being that Premise 1 can be rejected as the argument in favour of 
(2*) fails and as such THE ARGUMENT* is not sound. I shall then argue that this is a 
problematic approach to responding to THE ARGUMENT* insofar as the rejection of ontic 
transitivity inhibits the Presentist from coherently capturing the objective passage of time. 
Assuming, as I do, that capturing the objective passage of time is a key motivation for 
endorsing Presentism, I argue that it is unclear that this approach allows us to defend 
Presentism*. As such, at best this response refutes the claim in (2) but importantly not the 
claim in (2*).  
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In part 3.2, I move on to examine attempts to reject sub-premise (i) of Premise 2. The 
overarching approach to this response route is to argue that there do exist empirically 
equivalent theories to STR that are compatible with Presentism. The argument will be that the 
incompatibility of Einstein’s formulation of STR is not enough to prove the incompatibility of 
Presentism with our most fundamental physics. I shall look at Craig Bourne’s argument that 
there exists an empirically equivalent theory to STR that is compatible with Presentism. Key 
to the argument that there does exist such a theory will be the suggestion that the 
incompatibility of STR and Presentism relies on metaphysical assumptions in the 
interpretation of STR and not simply upon its empirical consequences. Assuming we wish to 
uphold (5), I shall argue that this response represents a viable rejection on sub-premise (i) and 
thus of the soundness of THE ARGUMENT*. 
Furthermore in section 3.3, I shall look towards attempts to reject the claim made in 
sub-premise (ii). Considering an argument given by Bradley Monton, the principle claim of 
this section will be that sub-premise (ii) can be refuted as there exist more fundamental 
theories of physics than STR, namely theories of Quantum Gravity, with which Presentism is 
compatible. Considering these theories are more fundamental than STR, the argument is that 
Presentism’s incompatibility with STR is essentially irrelevant to the truth of (1*). This route 
provides another viable option in response to THE ARGUMENT* for the Presentist and a 
good alternative for those not willing to commit to (5) as the previous response does. Given 
the viability of this and the previous response I shall conclude that the Presentist can refute 
THE ARGUMENT*.  
 
3.1 Challenging Premise 1. 
Premise 1 is the claim that STR and Presentism are incompatible and as we saw in Section 2, 
Putnam offers a convincing argument in favour of this claim. It has been argued however that 
Putnam’s argument fails insofar as the Presentist need not accept the principle of ontic 
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transitivity that leads to the contradiction Putnam proposed.
26
 In this section I shall examine 
the viability of this response. 
In order to do away with ontic transitivity, the Presentist needs to modify or at least 
clarify their theory somewhat. That is, the traditional or intuitive understanding of  the being-
present-for relation is that it is a transitive relation. This entails ontic transitivity and as such 
the Presentist who wishes to deny the principle of ontic transitivity needs to provide an 
explanation of how the present is to be defined given the principle of ontic transitivity does 
not hold. I shall go on to examine two versions of Presentism mentioned in the literature that 
do away with the principle of ontic transitivity and as such sidestep Putnam’s argument. What 
we shall see is that these views define the present as a relative concept. As such these views 
can and have collectively been labeled versions of Relativized Presentism.   
The argument of philosophers who champion these relativized versions of Presentism 
is that these are tenable versions of Presentism that are compatible with STR. If this is the 
case, Premise 1 is false and as a result THE ARGUMENT* is unsound. As we will see, the 
principle objection to the kinds of modifications needed to render Presentism compatible with 
STR is that the versions of Presentism that result from such an approach are drastically 
counter-intuitive or even implausible. Assessing the arguments for and against these modified 
versions of Presentism I argue that most of the objections to them are unsuccessful. However, 
whilst I do not find the typical objection to relativized Presentism to be particularly strong, 
there does exist a deeper problem with taking this route in response to THE ARGUMENT*. 
My contention is that whilst relativized Presentism is compatible with STR, it is 
unclear that these theories count as versions of Presentism*. As such whilst it may be shown 
that Presentism can be modified to fit in with the results of STR, it is unclear that doing so 
proves Presentism* is compatible with STR. I argue that the versions of Presentism shown to 
be compatible with STR do not fulfill the desiderata of Presentism*. As such it is not clear 
that this approach to the rejection of Premise 1 is useful for the purposes of defending 
Presentism*. Before we get to properly assessing the viability of this route in response to 
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THE ARGUMENT*, I shall, in the next sub-section, explicate the two versions of Relativized 
Presentism alleged to avoid Putnam’s argument in favor of (2*).       
 
3.1.1 Relativized Presentism. 
The first version of relativized Presentism to be discussed identifies the present with the here-
now. This view has been referred to (and will from now on) as ‘Point Presentism’. The 
present events, according to Point Presentists are the events simultaneous with an observer in 
a particular coordinate system at a time and in the same location, that is, those events that are 
here, now.
27
 This is quite unspecific. It isn’t clear in discussions about Point Presentism how 
far the here is supposed to be spatially extended. It is surely larger than a spacetime point but 
also surely not the size of the universe. Being charitable, let us assume, as I suspect it is often 
intended, that the view is that the events here-now are the events simultaneous with a 
particular observer in the observable vicinity of that observer.  
A more well defined version of relativized Presentism is Cone Presentism. On this 
view, what is meant by the present, for an observer, are the events on the surface on the past 
light of that observer.
28
 That is, the events from which light signals can reach P. A helpful 
way to consider this view is that it claims that what is present for an observer in a particular 
spatiotemporal location is what can be seen by the observer in that location.
29
  
 
 Both these views avoid the kind of contradiction Putnam suggests Presentism 
encounters when taken together with the results of STR. They do so by defining the present as 
a relative concept. As such these views avoid the transitivity usually associated with the 
relation of being-present-for and thus can reject the principle of ontic transitivity that Putnam 
claims hangs with Presentism. What is present for these views is relative to observers and as 
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such what exists is equally relative to observers. Let us now discuss the commitments of these 
views with reference to the example of Penny and John in order to get a better handle on how 
they avoid Putnam’s contradiction.  
For Point Presentism, the present events at some time for Penny are the events she is 
simultaneous with her in her coordinate system at that time and spatially near her. So at t=3, 
when she deduces that both A and B are simultaneous with her being level with John, the 
present for Penny includes those events (assuming Point Presentism extends the here to either 
end of the carriage). However, for John, at t=3, when he is level with Penny, A is past and B 
is yet to occur. For the Point Presentist, being a relativist about the present, suggests that 
understanding what is present in John and Penny’s world simply amounts to understanding 
the different perspectives of each observer. The present for Penny and John at t=3 in their 
world is constituted by a different set of events.  
 For Cone Presentism, the present for an observer, in her inertial frame, at some time 
are just the things on the surface of her past light cone at that point in spacetime. We can 
graphically depict the commitments of Cone Presentism with the use of a Minkowski 
spacetime diagram similar to one in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the world according to Penny at 
t=3 – that is, when A and B occurred, in her frame, simultaneously. Her future and past light 
cones are marked by the black dashed lines.  
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The events that lie on the surface of the past light cone of an event, E, are the events 
from which light can reach E. That is, the events on the bottom cone (or inverted ‘v’ shape 
here) of figure 3 are the events in the past which Penny can see at t=3 insofar as light rays 
from those events can reach her. The events on the surface of the future light cone (sitting on 
the upper ‘v’ in this diagram) are the events to which light can reach from Penny.  
Cone Presentism is the view that what is present is what is on the surface of the past 
light cone. That is, with reference to figure 3, what is present on this view for Penny in her 
inertial frame at the time depicted are events like C, lying on her past light cone. These are the 
events from which she receives light rays. We can imagine C being an event at the front of 
the carriage (at the same spatial coordinates as A) that she is still observing as she passes 
John. According to Cone Presentism, A and B are not present for Penny when she passes 
John, unlike in the traditional Presentist view or in the Point Presentist view. A and B will 
only be present for Penny (if she stays put in the middle of the carriage) at the time where the 
red cone lines interest the vertical axis. That is, we can imagine the intersection of the red 
lines marking the light cones of future-Penny. If Penny stays where she is, and ends up in a 
Figure 3: 
Depicting Cone 
Presentism. 
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  A   B 
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spacetime position like future-Penny then in the near future she will observe the events A and 
B and thus according to Cone Presentism, observe them as present at that future point in time. 
Remember, Putnam’s contradiction arose due to the idea that John would deduce that 
Penny is present and so real for him at the same time as Penny would deduce B is real for her. 
Assuming ontic transitivity, this would mean B is real for John. However B is future for John 
and as such future events are real. However, the Point and Cone Presentist flatly denies this 
move. For the Point Presentist, B being real for Penny at t=3 does not mean it must be real for 
John at t=3. The present is a relative notion on this view, defined as what is here-now for an 
observer. As such Putnam’s argument does not seem to work against such a view. For the 
Cone Presentist, the present events are not those that are simultaneous with an observer but 
those that are observable or rather, from whence light signals can reach an observer. This 
does not entail transitivity and so even considering the case when John and Penny can 
observe each, it is not true that events present for each must be or are present for the other on 
the Cone Presentist view. Both these versions of relativized Presentism thus seem to avoid 
Putnam’s contradiction by avoiding a commitment to the principle of ontic transitivity.           
 
3.1.2 Assessing Relativized Presentism. 
It has been suggested that both Cone and Point Presentism face drastically counterintuitive 
results that render them both untenable. Steve Savitt, for one, offers a notable argument to this 
affect against both theories in his paper ‘There’s No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski 
Spacetime)’.30 In this subsection I shall examine Savitt’s objections to both the relativized 
Presentist theories discussed and Mark Hinchliff’s subsequent defenses of both theories in 
order to assess the viability of adopting either theory as a means of refuting (2*) and in turn 
THE ARGUMENT* at large. I shall argue that relativized Presentist is largely unscathed by 
Savitt’s attack on Cone and Point Presentism. However I shall later suggest that relativized 
Presentism is problematic for different reasons.  
In regards to Point Presentism, Savitt argues that it is an undesirable result of this 
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theory that spatially separated observers whose world lines never cross, that is, are never in 
the same vicinity will never be present to and so will never exist to one another.
31
 The 
counterintuitive result here being that observers we do not interact spatially can never be 
confirmed to exist according to Point Presentism. Another counterintuitive result of Point 
Presentism noted by Putnam is that not all past events will have been present on this view.
32
 
That is, events in the past of an observer that were never events in the vicinity of that observer 
will not thus have been present to this observer. Putnam suggests that this contradicts the 
allegedly conceptual truth about time that past events were all once present.
33
 Both these 
points can be said to be examples of Point Presentism’s failure to capture what appear to be 
intuitive features of time.  
In regards to Cone Presentism, Savitt argues that this view has the rather unsavoury 
consequence that potentially very distant past and future events count as being part of the 
present.
34
 The argument is that if we identify the present with the surface of the past light 
cone, events we are still observing that occurred in the very distant past, such as (to use his 
example) the cosmic microwave background radiation, are just as real or present as the events 
that occur around us today.
35
 What’s more, Savitt argues that it seems arbitrary to distinguish 
the present as just the things on an event’s past light cone and not also include its future light 
cone.
36
 The contention is, if we add these events to this conception of the present, very distant 
future events of the universe must also be included in the present. The objection is simply that 
it seems absurd to define the present in such a way that it includes distant past and future 
events. For this reason, Savitt objects that the theory fails to satisfy the intuitive principle of 
achronality – the principle that if events are present for E, they should not be in the absolute 
future or past of E.
37
 Clearly Cone Presentism violates this principle and it is alleged that this 
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is a serious worry for a theory of Presentism. 
Mark Hinchliff responds to the kinds of objections just raised to Cone and Point 
Presentism by noting that these objections fulfill a similar formula. The formula being as 
follows. First a residual intuition from the pre-relativistic conception of time is noted, then it 
is argued that a particular theory of Relativized Presentism fails to account for this intuition 
and then that thus this this theory is objectionable.
38
 Returning to the objections we can see 
this is true. In regards to Point Presentism, Savitt argues that it fails to account for the 
intuition that spatially separated observers will never be present but note this is only a 
possibility when we are able to refer to an absolute universe wide set of present events. 
Capturing this intuition thus requires absolute time or a fixed foliation. However these 
concepts do not exist in a relativistic understanding of time and are simply remnants of a 
classical or Newtonian conception of time.  
The response from Hinchliff is that as the Relativized Presentist aims to fit 
Presentism into a relativized spacetime there is no good reason why their account should 
capture intuitions that require pre-relativistic concepts. In fact, it is precisely their aim not to 
capture a pre-relativistic conception of time but rather to adapt Presentism to fit in with what 
relativity theory suggests about time. The same point can be made against the argument that 
relativized theories fail to capture the alleged conceptual truth that past events were present 
and the principle of achronality. Such intuitions do not fit within the relativistic understanding 
of time. As such it is misguided to argue that it is a disadvantage of relativized Presentist 
theories that they fail to capture such intuitions. Rather, as Hinchliff suggests, it should be an 
expectation of these theories that they fail to capture the allegedly intuitive pre-relativistic 
features of time that relativity theory disproved.
39
 As such these kinds of arguments appear to 
miss the point of Relativized Presentism and do not provide good grounds to reject either 
Cone or Point Presentism.     
A further alleged worry for Point Presentism raised by Savitt is that it collapses into 
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Eternalism.
40
 The claim is that relativizing the present and thus the ontology to each and 
every observer is essentially the same view as, or collapses into the view that every event 
exists – that is, Eternalism. The worry for the Presentist here would be that if this is true, they 
would no longer be Presentist. Savitt raises this issue in regards to Point Presentism and it 
could on the same rationale, be hedged against Cone Presentism for Cone Presentism 
similarly relativizes the ontology to each observer (in terms of the events on their past light 
cone). 
If relativizing the ontology is not the aim of Point Presentism, Savitt entertains the 
suggestion that Point Presentism is the view that simply one observers here-now constitutes 
the ontology.
41
 Savitt suggests that if, in fact, relativized Presentists do not actually intend to 
relativize the present to each and every observer, they may intend that just one observer has 
access to the proper ontology.
42
 This could be applied to Cone Presentism insofar as a Cone 
Presentist could hold that just the events on the past light cone of one observer constitute the 
ontology. In regards to this possible interpretation of relativized Presentist theories Savitt 
gives no solid objection. His claim is simply that such a position would result in an incredibly 
strange theory of spatiotemporal solipsism.
43
 Considering according to Savitt the traditional 
interpretation of Relativized Presentism faces a slide into Eternalism, Savitt presents the 
alternately interpretation to create a kind of dilemma for the Relativized Presentist. That is, he 
argues that both interpretations are problematic.  
Whilst this seems at face value to be a serious dilemma for the relativized Presentist it 
certainly is not. The alleged collapse from relativizing ontology to inadvertently committing 
to Eternalism does not follow. It simply is not true that relativizing the ontology to each and 
every possible observer amounts to the view or collapses into the view that each and every 
event exits as Eternalism suggests. This branch of Savitt’s alleged dilemma seems 
unproblematic. At most it is counterintuitive but, as stated, this is simply the position that 
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Relativized Presentist have adopted in light of the consequences of relativity theory. For 
proponents of this approach these counterintuitive results are consequences of their theory 
they are willing to bear. Savitt gives no good argument to suggest that such a theory is 
anything worse than strange.  
In regards to the other branch of the dilemma, it certainly seems that the intended 
reading of relativized Presentist theories is not typically this ontologically restricted view. In 
the absence of a clear commitment to this kind of view in the literature and considering the 
other more typical interpretation of relativized Presentism avoids Savitt’s worry, I shall not 
spend time defending this interpretation here. However, it should be noted that Savitt’s 
objection to it similarly does not extend beyond contending that the theory is strange. As 
argued, such claims are not objections that will worry the proponents this view.   
For the reasons given, the typical objections to Cone and Point Presentism do not 
seem to achieve much more than to suggest that they are surprising and in ways strange 
theories. They do not provide good grounds to reject either theory or suggest either is 
untenable. I shall go on to argue that whilst there do not appear to be any knock-down 
objections to theories of Relativized Presentism, there is a further worry in adopting these 
versions of Presentism that relates to fulfilling the desiderata of Presentism*. I shall argue 
Relativized Presentist theories do not properly fulfill the desiderata of Presentism* and as 
such shall contend that adopting such versions of Presentism does not help us properly refute 
THE ARGUMENT*.   
 
3.1.3 My concern with Relativized Presentism.  
In section 1.1 I explored the principle motivations for adopting Presentism. In doing so I 
suggested three key desiderata for any theory of Presentism that properly captures the key 
distinguishing motivations of Presentism and labeled views that captured these desiderata as 
versions of Presentism*. The desiderata were as follow. 
 
Presentism*:  a) all and only the present events exist. 
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b) the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. 
c) avoids the present problem.   
 
I suggested that were a theory of Presentism not to account for b) it would fail to 
capture the key motivation for favoring an A-theoretic view over of a B-theoretic view of 
time. Hence, I suggest that Presentist theories that do not capture b) are not the kinds of 
theories Presentists ought to defend. I now swish to argue that it is unclear that relativized 
Presentism captures b) and as such adopting relativized Presentism in order to avoid (2*) is an 
undesirable approach to the argument in favour of (1*) and in fact is not a successful 
refutation of THE ARGUMENT*. 
Relativized Presentist theories such as Cone and Point Presentism relativize the 
present and the ontology to observers. According to these views observers in different inertial 
frames disagree not just about what is present but also what exists. The view is that ontology 
is a relative notion. On these views, events do not objectively bear A-theoretic properties such 
as ‘present-ness’ that change as time passes, they simply bear them relative to coordinate 
systems. It is not clear to me how this can be said to reflect an objective passage of time in the 
same way that Presentism* (with a traditional understanding of absolute ontology and A-
properties) is alleged to do so. Relativized Presentism seems at best to account for passage in 
a relative or perspectival sense but this is not what is meant by b). Thus I contend that 
Relativized Presentism fails to capture b).   
Relativized Presentists might respond that objective passage, or the kind that 
Presentism* requires, cannot be made sense of in a relativized setting and as such the failing 
of relativized Presentism to capture it is not an appropriate criticism of the theory in the same 
sense as the failure to capture other pre-relativistic intuitions is not an appropriate objection to 
the theory. However, if they are committed to denying that b) is a part of their theory then I 
fail to see where the motivation for adopting relativized Presentism lies. At this point, it is 
beginning to look like an unmotivated view that bears the consequence of ontic relativity for 
no reward. That is, if we do not gain the alleged explanatory ability of Presentism*, what is 
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there to set this theory apart as preferable to Eternalism in a relativized setting? The burden 
lies on the Relativized Presentist to show that their theory of Presentism does capture the 
passage of time in the same or, at least a comparable way that non-relativized Presentism 
allegedly does. I cannot see how it could or does.  
Considering I just wish to defend versions of Presentism* and argue that Presentists 
at large also should, I do not find adopting relativized Presentism appealing and do not 
recommend it as a response to THE ARGUMENT*. In this way, in the absence of a good 
argument in favour of the claim that Point of Cone Presentism are versions of Presentism*, 
the approach explored here in section 3.1 fails to show THE ARGUMENT* is unsound 
insofar as it fails to refute (2*). This rejection of Premise 1 via a commitment to Relativized 
Presentism thus does not seem to be viable route in response to THE ARGUMENT*.  
Whilst it could be argued that Relativized Presentism is compatible with STR it is 
unclear that therefore Presentism* is compatible with STR. For the Presentist who is not 
concerned with upholding the desiderata of Presentism*, refuting Premise 1 by adopting a 
version of Relativized Presentism is a viable response to THE ARGUMENT (note, no ‘*’). 
However, as my purpose is to defend Presentism*, I cannot recommend this approach in 
response to THE ARGUMENT*. As we will see there are other viable responses available for 
the Presentist who is concerned with defending Presentism* from (1*) by way of rejecting 
other premises of THE ARGUMENT*.  
 
3.2 Challenging Sub-Premise (i). 
A more viable response to THE ARGUMENT* for the Presentist hoping to fulfill the 
desiderata of Presentism* lies in attacking sub-premise (i) of the second premise. In this 
section I shall aim to show that this sub-premise can be refuted in response to THE 
ARGUMENT*. Remember, sub-premise (i) states that there are no empirically equivalent 
theories to STR that are compatible with Presentism. As such the argument in this section will 
be that there such theories and that considering we wish to uphold (5), demonstrating such 
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theories exist is enough to refute the second premise and so the inference from (2*) to (1*).    
I shall go on to consider Craig Bourne’s attempts to modify STR in a way that builds 
in a privileged frame so as to avoid the contradiction faced by coupling Presentism with the 
results of STR. My argument shall be that Bourne offers us a means to reject sub-premise (ii) 
insofar as he provides examples of an empirically equivalent theory to STR that is compatible 
with Presentism*. Assuming (5), I shall argue this is enough to prove THE ARGUMENT* is 
unsound. The idea being that the incompatibility of Presentism* and STR is not enough to 
prove that Presentism* is incompatible with fundamental physics as there exist tenable 
interpretations of STR (or modified versions of STR) that are compatible with Presentism*. 
That is, we can reject (i) and thus the inference from (2*) to (1*). 
 
3.2.1 Bourne’s Argument. 
Craig Bourne argues against the claim that Presentism and STR are incompatible due to the 
fact that the Presentist can offer empirically equivalent theories to STR that are compatible 
with Presentism.
44
 This is thus an argument against (2). I shall not be following Bourne in 
arguing from the existence of empirically equivalent versions of STR that are compatible with 
Presentism* (call these STR*) to the claim that (2) is false. However, as mentioned, I shall be 
mining his argument for an argument in favour of the claim that (ii) is false. Bourne’s 
argument is that the incompatibility of Presentism and STR rests on assumptions in STR that 
are not part of the testable empirical predictions of the theory and as such are open to 
modification.
45
 I differ from Bourne insofar as where he argues in favour of adopting a 
modified versions of STR  in order to avoid the incompatibility, I simply wish to argue that it 
is enough for the Presentist to demonstrate theories of STR* exist in order to refute (ii) and 
the soundness of THE ARGUMENT*. 
Bourne’s project is threefold. First he shows that STR only precludes a privileged 
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frame and is thus incompatible with Presentism due to assumptions to do with defining 
simultaneity. Second he goes on to show that we can meaningfully define a relation of 
absolute simultaneity and posit a privileged frame in STR by rejecting the aforementioned 
assumptions. Thirdly he argues that this new theory, a modified version of STR, is 
empirically equivalent to STR. 
Bourne argues that the contention in STR that there is no privileged or absolute rest 
frame arises out of the assumption that a relation of simultaneity requires verification.
 46
 That 
is, Bourne notes, part of Einstein’s definition of simultaneity entails that only verifiable or 
empirically determinable instances of simultaneity are legitimate instances of simultaneity.
47
 
As according to STR we can only determine relative simultaneity, Einstein suggests absolute 
simultaneity is meaningless. The idea is that because no physical experiment could ascertain 
what events are absolutely simultaneous, such a concept is meaningless.
48
 However, even 
granting that it is true that no physical experiment could determine what events are absolutely 
simultaneous, it does not follow from this discovery that therefore the concepts of absolute 
simultaneity or a privileged frame are meaningless. It has not been shown that a privileged 
frame must not exist, just that no experiment could identify it. Bourne notes that the 
aforementioned assumption that simultaneity has to be experimentally verifiable is something 
we can freely reject.
49
 He goes on to argue that we can also define absolute simultaneity in 
STR and subsequently construct an empirical equivalent theory to STR with this added 
notion.        
Furthermore, Bourne offers a definition of absolute simultaneity in STR to 
demonstrate that we can meaningfully define such a concept in STR. His argument is that 
once we dismiss the assumption that simultaneity has to be experimentally verifiable we can 
define absolute simultaneity quite easily. Really the only obstruction to understanding 
absolute simultaneity is the aforementioned assumption. Once this assumption rejected, 
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Bourne argues that there is nothing more to understanding absolute simultaneity than 
understanding the conjunction of true present tensed propositions.
50
 Another way to put this, 
that is perhaps more obvious, is simply to assert that there is a privileged frame and the 
absolutely simultaneous events at a moment are those events simultaneous at that moment in 
the privileged frame. We understand what simultaneity is in an inertial frame and so to define 
absolute simultaneity we simply need to pick one of these frames and assert that the relation 
of simultaneity (defined the usual way) that binds the events in that frame is the relation of 
absolute simultaneity.     
The claim is that once we reject the assumption that simultaneity must be verifiable it 
is quite a simple operation to define absolute simultaneity. This operation hinges on the 
assertion that there is a metaphysically distinguished frame. This is the only substantial 
change Bourne’s STR bears to Einstein’s STR. That is, Bourne’s STR is otherwise exactly the 
same as STR, the Lorentz transformations still correctly determined the disagreement of 
temporal and spatial intervals between events in different coordinate systems and as such all 
the empirical predictions remain the same.
51
 It is just that in STR* one frame is 
metaphysically distinguished. Clearly then STR* is empirically equivalent to STR just 
metaphysically different. STR* simply replaces the assumption that no frame is 
metaphysically distinguished with the assumption that one is. 
 
3.2.2 Assessing Bourne’s argument. 
It has been argued that adopting modified versions of STR that posit a privileged frame is 
problematic. There are three principle objections to the kind of modified version of STR that 
Bourne addresses in defense of his project. The objections are that Bourne’s modified version 
of STR is open to a conspiracy of silence objection, that it is somehow less theoretically 
desirable than Einstein’s formulation of STR and that assuming his formulation and 
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Presentism we become open to the present problem.
52
 I shall argue that the first two of these 
objections do not succeed in showing that STR* is untenable. The third is of more importance 
to the project of this thesis; if it were true that Bourne’s modified version of STR and 
Presentism result in the present problem it would not have been shown that (i) is false. That 
is, it would not have been shown that Presentism* is compatible with theories empirically 
equivalent to STR. I shall argue however, that the present problem does not arise given 
Bourne’s version of STR.  
The first objection to Bourne’s approach is that his modified versions of STR is open 
to a conspiracy of silence objection. Bourne’s version of STR requires that there is some kind 
of conspiracy in nature to hide the privileged frame from experimental discovery.
53
 This is 
taken to be wildly coincidental and thus objectionable.
54
 The idea being that scientific 
theories should involve the least coincidences as possible. If there were a privileged frame it 
would require that nature includes a deep asymmetry and compensatory factors to properly 
ensure that such an asymmetry is not discovered empirically.
55
 The argument is not that due 
to this required conspiracy there must not be a privileged frame but simply that positing a 
privileged frame is inelegant and not a sufficiently motivated move considering regular 
formulation of STR to avoid this result.    
Bourne essentially bites the bullet on this point and does not argue that such a 
conspiracy is not a result of his theory. His argument in defense is that this is simply a cost of 
a better total theory.
56
 That is, what we lose in terms of theoretical elegance by positing a 
privileged frame, we gain in the metaphysical advantages of Presentism. Assuming the 
Presentist feels their theory of temporal ontology comes with some explanatory advantages 
over B-theoretic theories, the Presentist has a motivation for bearing the theoretic inelegance 
that might come with this modified version of STR. It is just not true, from the Presentist 
                                                        
52
 ibid., pp. 19-23. 
53
 ibid., p. 19. 
54
 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
55
 ibid., p. 19. 
56
 ibid., pp. 20-21. 
  Patrick Dempsey - 309257670 
 33 
perspective, that adopting a modification of STR like Bourne’s is unmotivated. The 
Presentist, in virtue of their intuitions, feels precisely the opposite way. It should be noted, 
this is not a strong argument in favour of adopting this modified version of STR over the 
original formulation for it relies on Presentist intuitions to get off the ground. However, the 
Presentist does not require a good argument to that effect, the point is just that the arguments 
against adopting such versions of STR similarly rest on metaphysical intuitions and thus are 
similarly weak.     
It is also argued that Einstein’s formulation of STR involves less spacetime structure 
and as such is more parsimonious and thus preferable to modified versions that posit a 
privileged frame.
57
 The argument being that there are reasons to favour unmodified versions 
of STR over versions such as Bourne’s. However, in response to this claim it could equally be 
argued that the Presentist’s theory is more parsimonious overall.58 That is, it can be counter-
argued that Presentism offers more ontological parsimony that Eternalism. If it is simplicity 
that we are after, Bourne’s points is, we should, arguably, favour his approach – the Presentist 
approach. This counter-argument will no doubt not persuade Eternalists to adopt a modified 
version of STR. As such, this is not a particularly strong argument in favour of the choosing a 
modified version over Einstein’s. However, the point is just, for Presentist at least, the 
theoretical advantages of standard formulations of STR are outweighed by the advantages of 
adopting a theory that is compatible with Presentism. This objection is not going to trouble a 
Presentist and certainly does not show that Bourne’s version of STR is terribly problematic. It 
simply shows that it is slightly more complex. However, for the Presentist the cost of such 
complexity is outweighed by what they feel is a metaphysical reward.   
The final significant objection Bourne considers is whether this modified 
understanding of STR leaves us susceptible to the present problem. Remember the present 
problem was the problem of knowing whether our now is present. As suggested, it is a 
desideratum of Presentism* that it avoid the present problem as doing so is a major 
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motivation for favouring Presentism over other A-theoretic theories of ontology. If it were the 
case that STR* and Presentism left Presentism open to the present problem, it would not have 
shown that Presentism* was compatible with a theory empirically equivalent to STR. As such 
the argument run in this section would not work for the purposes of defending Presentism* 
from THE ARGUMENT*.  As it turns out, I do not think Presentism is susceptible to The 
Present Problem when coupled with Bourne’s STR*.  
The argument that Bourne’s modified leaves Presentism susceptible to the present 
problem is that since we cannot experimentally determine the privileged frame, we cannot 
therefore ever know what events are absolutely present.
59
 If we cannot know the absolutely 
present events, the worry is, we cannot know we are amongst the present events and thus are 
open to the present problem. This might seem problematic at first glance but on closer 
inspection the argument does not work. It does not follow from the fact that we cannot know 
what constitutes the privileged frame that we cannot know that we are present.
60
 We must be 
present insofar as we exist according to Presentism.  
To be more precise, what we cannot know in world with a privileged frame is how 
the events we experience in our coordinate system are spatiotemporally arranged and thus 
observed in the metaphysically privileged coordinate system. To illustrate with reference to 
the Penny and John example; neither Penny and John can know the correct sequence of the 
events A and B. For Penny, they are simultaneous and for John, they are not. The claim of 
STR* is just that there is a privileged frame in which there is an absolute say on what the 
sequence A and B occur in. Penny and John and everyone can be sure that they are present on 
Bourne’s view, they just cannot be sure what else is present at any instant. Or rather, they 
cannot know which instant or set of simultaneous events their feeling present is a part of 
according to the metaphysically privileged frame. This is not the same as the present problem 
and as such I do not think STR* is incompatible with Presentism* for that reason.     
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Even though STR* involves more spacetime structure and perhaps an odd conspiracy 
of silence with respect to the privileged frame, I contend that the Presentist need not actually 
provide thorough arguments in favor of defending STR* as preferable to Einstein’s 
formulation of STR. It is not the aim here to argue that there is a better version of STR that 
we should adopt. The aim here is simply to argue that there do exist viable empirically 
equivalent theories to STR, STR*, and that these are compatible with Presentism*. I believe 
Bourne shows that there is such theories and that these are most certainly compatible with 
Presentism*. Such theories demonstrate that the incompatibility of STR and Presentism rests 
on assumptions in STR and not purely upon the empirical results of the theory. That is, the 
empirical results of STR can be interpreted in a way that is compatible with Presentism*. 
Assuming (5) is important, that is, that the truth of (1) ought to rest on the empirical results of 
theories allegedly incompatible with Presentism, showing that theories like Bourne’s exist 
and are relatively unproblematic is enough to prove (i) is false and so that THE 
ARGUMENT* is unsound. 
 
3.3 Challenging Sub-Premise (ii). 
The response to THE ARGUMENT* just discussed requires a commitment to (5) to be 
successful. For those not compelled to accept (5) there exists another equally convincing 
response to THE ARGUMENT* that involves the rejection of sub-premise (ii). The aim of 
this section is to show with reference to an argument given by Bradley Monton that such a 
route in response to THE ARGUMENT* is another a viable option for the Presentist 
concerned by (1*).   
 
3.3.1 Monton’s argument. 
Bradley Monton has argued that there are theories of physics more fundamental than STR 
with which Presentism is compatible and as such offers an argument to reject (ii).
61
 Monton’s 
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argument is that Presentism is compatible with theories of Quantum Gravity (from here on 
‘QG’) and that these are more fundamental theories than STR.62 Given this, Monton’s claim 
is that Presentism’s incompatibility with STR is entirely irrelevant to its compatibility with 
our most fundamental physics.
63
 If this is true, the Presentist can refute the inference from (2) 
to (1). In regards to THE ARGUMENT* this response offers the Presentist a good refutation 
of sub-premise (ii) and, by extension, of the soundness of THE ARGUMENT*.  
 Monton’s argument rests on two crucial points. First that theories of QG are more 
fundamental than STR and secondly that there do exist theories of QG that are compatible 
with Presentism. The first of these claims is uncontroversial.
64
 Quantum mechanical theories 
deal with physics at a microscopic level and thus can be said to be more fundamental that 
theories of relativity. In regards to the second claim, Monton suggests that there certainly are 
theories of QG that include a fixed foliation of spacetime, call these ‘FF theories of QG’.65 
The suggestion is not that these theories entail or prove Presentism but include a fixed 
foliation of spacetime and as such can be interpreted to be compatible with Presentism.
66
  
Such theories of QG remain silent on the ontological status of times but so long as a 
theory includes a fixed foliation of spacetime we can interpret them in such a way that 
precludes the existence of non-present times.
67
 That is, the theories of QG that involve a fixed 
foliation do not come with a metaphysical commitment for or against Presentism but able to 
be interpreted in a way that is compatible with Presentism. Monton recognizes that the FF 
theories of QG are spacetime theories and such utilize four dimensional spacetime models.
68
 
His point however, is that this alone does not entail Eternalism or preclude Presentism. A four 
dimensional spacetime model can be interpreted in such a way that it specifies one space-like 
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hyper-surface to represent the set of existing things and that, moreover, this set changes.
69
 
This is how an FF theory if QG can be interpreted in Presentist terms. As it stands, Physicists 
do not specify metaphysical interpretation of FF theories of QG and as such this Presentist 
interpretation is not precluded. Importantly physicists have not settled on a best theory of QG 
and FF theories are amongst the proposed candidates. 
 
3.3.2 Assessing Monton’s Argument. 
It has been argued in response to Monton’s suggestion that whilst there do exist FF theories of 
QG we ought not adopt such theories of QG for various reasons and thus theories 
incompatible with Presentism* are preferable. The principle objections to FF theories of QG 
revolve around three general points. First, that relativity theory has suggested that it is likely 
that the correct theory of QG will be incompatible with Presentism. Second, that the 
arguments in favour of choosing a theory of QG with a fixed foliation are bad ones. And 
finally, that theories of QG without fixed foliation are favorable for reasons to do with 
theoretical simplicity. Monton responds to arguments of all these kinds. 
 In regards to the point that STR or the results of relativity theory suggests that FF 
theories of QG are unlikely, the argument is, regardless of the incompatibility of relativity 
theory and Quantum Mechanics, we should carry over the basic lesson learnt in STR that time 
is space-like.
70
 That is, the results of relativity theory has indicated that fixed foliation is 
unlikely.
71
 Monton questions both the assumption that we ought to carry over any lessons 
from STR into quantum mechanics and the assumption that if we were to carry over some 
lesson it should be the lesson that time is space-like. His argument is, firstly, there are plenty 
of outdated and overturned scientific theories we do not mine for lessons.
72
 Secondly, he 
suggests, it is not clear that the relevant or primary lesson of relativity theory is that time is 
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space-like or that there is no privileged frame.
73
 The lesson of importance could well be just 
that we cannot determine what the privileged frame is. Considering the argument of Bourne, 
it is arguable that this is all STR has taught us. For these reasons, this argument against 
adopting a theory of QG that involves a fixed foliation seems unsuccessful. 
In relation to the latter two objection – that the arguments for adopting a theory of 
QG that accommodate Presentism are poor or that theories of QG without FF are simpler and 
so more favorable – there seems to be good responses for the proponent of FF theories of QG 
available. In relation to first point, that there are no good arguments in favouring of preferring 
an FF theories, for the Presentist, there are good arguments to do so. For they believe their 
intuitions are good ones and ought to be accommodated in theories of physics.
74
 Obviously, 
the non-Presentist will disagree on this point but arguing that there are no good arguments in 
favour of selecting a theory that is compatible with Presentism seems simply to amount to 
begging the question against Presentism. As such this is not a particularly threatening 
argument. 
 To the claim that theories of QG without a fixed foliation are more favorable insofar 
as they are more theoretically parsimonious, Monton suggests that the Presentist can simply 
reject that theoretical parsimony is a good guide to truth.
75
 The idea is that theories of QG 
without FF involve less spacetime structure and so are simpler and thus more appealing. 
Whilst it may be true that they are simpler, it need not be accepted by the Presentist (or 
anyone) that simplicity is a good guide to truth or to the best theory. Again, considering the 
Presentist is concerned with accounting for temporal passage in a way that requires FF, they 
will not be moved by arguments in favour of theories that do not include FF simply because 
they are more parsimonious. Additionally, following Bourne, the Presentist could argue that 
theirs is a more ontologically parsimonious theory of ontology. As such, if it parsimony that 
one desires there is a case to favour a theory of QG with a fixed foliation of spacetime 
                                                        
73
 ibid., p. 269. 
74
 ibid., pp. 272-3. 
75
 ibid., p. 271. 
  Patrick Dempsey - 309257670 
 39 
because these theories offer us a route to a more parsimonious ontology. For these reason, this 
objections does not seem particularly threatening to the Presentist who wishes to suggest we 
adopt an FF theory of QG. 
As suggested by Monton there are extant theories of QG that do include a fixed 
foliation and that as such can be interpreted to accommodate Presentism.
76
 There are no 
substantial reasons why such theories of QG ought not be adopted. The only arguments 
against them seems to come in the form of thinly veiled attacks on the Presentist’s intuitions. 
The aim of this sub-section was to show that there do exist more fundamental theories of 
physics than STR that are compatible with Presentism. FF theories of QG prove that there are 
and as such sub-premise (ii) is false. Assuming we wish to uphold (4), demonstrating the 
existence of such theories is enough for the Presentist to properly reject (ii) and thus prove 
THE ARGUMENT* is unsound.  
 
3.4 Summing up the Responses. 
In summary, I feel the Presentist can respond to THE ARGUMENT*. As argued, I contend 
that the rejection of Premise 1 is not viable response to THE ARGUMENT* as the rejection 
of ontic transitivity required for such an approach leaves the Presentist unable to fulfill the 
desiderata of Presentism*. That is, I admit Presentism* is most likely incompatible with the 
results of STR as formulated by Einstein. However, given an additional commitment to (4) 
and (5) I argue, for the reasons discussed, the Presentist can adequately refute THE 
ARGUMENT* by attacking the sub-premises in its second premise.  
Whilst I (and certainly some others) find (5) to be an uncontroversial assumption, I 
grant that (5) may not seem as such to all. Whilst I argue it is a viable response, the rejection 
of (i) rests on this being accepted and thus this route in response to THE ARGUMENT* may 
not be desirable to all. Regardless, the alternative route to rejecting the second premise is 
uncontroversial. That is, rejecting (ii) on the grounds that (4) holds is unproblematic. 
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Considering Monton’s argument that some extant theories of QG are compatible with 
Presentism, it has to be said that the jury is still out with respect to whether our most 
fundamental physics is incompatible with Presentism* or not. As it stands theories more 
fundamental than STR are compatible with Presentism* and thus (ii) can be refuted. I argue 
that this and the refutation of (i) both on their own show that THE ARGUMENT* is unsound.  
 
Section 4: Concluding Remarks. 
 
4.1 The Future of Presentism. 
As it turns out, Monton finishes his paper remarking that the scientific community favors 
theories of QG that do not include a fixed foliation.
77
 More specifically, the most popular 
theories of QG used to resolve the incompatibility with Relativity theory, M Theory and Loop 
Quantum Gravity, appear both to be incompatible with Presentism*.
78
 So what does this mean 
for the future of Presentism? Well, only that if the trend is going any direction in science it is 
against theories with a fixed foliation of space-time and so against theories compatible with 
Presentism. But this is not a death sentence. Let us assume that our best science does settle on  
a theory of QG that precludes Presentism, what are the Presentist’s options? 
There are at least two routes I feel the Presentist should avoid in response to this 
hypothetical scenario. For the reasons given in regards to Relativized Presentism, I do not 
think the Presentist should look to develop theories that fit into spacetime models that 
preclude a fixed foliation. That is, I believe that, at least from assessing relativized 
Presentism, Presentism* requires a fixed foliation of spacetime to fulfill the desiderata that set 
it a part from other theories. Further, assuming we settle on a theory of QG that precludes 
Presentism, I feel it would be preferable for the Presentist not to have to reject scientific 
realism in order to survive.      
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A better response to such a scenario would be to assess whether, when we settle on a 
theory of QG that precludes Presentism, (5) is satisfied. That is, as I contend that (5) should 
hold, settling on a theory of QG that precludes Presentism will only equate to a good 
argument in favour of (1*) provided no empirical equivalent theories to this hypothetical 
theory of QG are compatible with Presentism. This is simply to say, a potential route in 
response to this hypothetical scenario for the Presentist would be to assess whether the 
empirical results of this hypothetical theory of QG preclude Presentism or whether 
assumptions built into its interpretation result in this incompatibility.  
We will have to wait and see what physical theories are settled on and in what respect 
they are incompatible with Presentism if they are alleged to be. The point of this section is 
simply to entertain the possibility that Presentism is shown to be incompatible with a 
hypothetically accepted theory of QG and suggest that even this would not necessarily fulfill 
the requirements of a proof for (1*). For now at least the Presentist can take comfort in the 
fact that there exits no sound argument in favour of (1*).   
 
4.2 Conclusion. 
It has been suggested that Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics, that 
is (1*). The aim of this thesis is to assess the soundness of the best argument in favour of this 
claim, that is, THE ARGUMENT*. Whilst the Presentist faces a difficulty in articulating the 
motivating features of their theory when objecting to the claim that Presentism is compatible 
with STR there exist other viable routes in response to THE ARGUMENT*. As such the 
Presentist need not show Presentism* is compatible with STR.  
I argue that the existence of empirically equivalent theories to STR that are 
compatible with Presentism allows the Presentist to reject sub-premise (i) of THE 
ARGUMENT* and thus show it is unsound. What’s more, the existence of more fundamental 
theories of physics than STR that are compatible with Presentism allow us to reject sub-
premise (ii) of THE ARGUEMNT* and thus show it is unsound. Due to these viable 
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responses, the best argument in favour of the claim that Presentism is incompatible with our 
best physics fails. At least for the time being, it has not been soundly shown that Presentism is 
incompatible with our most fundamental physics. Looking forward, I suggest that future 
arguments to the same effect be treated with the same scrutiny as THE ARGUMENT* has 
been in this thesis.          
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